Welcome to MSW’s Scuttlebutt! Here’s the news for the day.
Navy Word of the Day
Continuing on with your Naval education, Jim Adams bring you another installment of MSW’s Navy Word of the Day.
Word of the Day
Review - Hasegawa IJN Kaga 1941
MSW Crewmember Anthony Kochevar (AJKOCHEV) shares with us an in box review on the Hasegawa 1:700 IJN Kaga Aircraft Carrier as she sailed in 1941.
Review
S.S. Meteor Whaleback
Today’s website is the S.S. Meteor Whaleback. The S.S. Meteor — the Last Whaleback on Earth remaining of these innovative ships (called whalebacks for their rounded hulls) designed by Captain Alexander McDougall. Launched from Superior in 1896, she carried a variety of cargos on the Great Lakes, including iron ore, grain, cars, and oil. In 1972 she was brought home to Superior and is now permanently berthed on Barkers Island. Enjoy.
Website
This Day in U.S. Naval History
1941 - First escort carrier, USS Long Island (CVE 1), commissioned.
General Dynamics Awarded Contract to Continue Work on U.S. Navy's Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program
Source: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems
FAIRFAX, Va. --- The U.S. Navy has awarded General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems a $39.9 million contract for development and production as part of the Navy's Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 1B.
The contract provides for the production and delivery of SEWIP Block 1B2 systems as well as the development and delivery of two Engineering Development Models for SEWIP Block 1B3. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems is a business unit of General Dynamics.
SEWIP is an evolutionary acquisition block upgrade program for the U.S. Navy's primary surface ship electronic warfare and anti-ship missile defense system, the AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare suite, which has been installed on naval combatants and auxiliaries since the late 1970s. The SEWIP Block 1B upgrades are expected to provide a vast improvement to the Surface Navy's Anti-Ship missile defense by enhancing the detection and identification capabilities that assist sailors in defending ships from emerging threats.
"Our work on SEWIP is an example of General Dynamics leveraging its open architecture expertise and commitment to an open business model," said Michael Tweed-Kent, vice president and general manager of integrated combat systems for General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems. "We will provide the Navy with the best industry solution and significantly improve the warfighter's capabilities."
Under this contract, General Dynamics will continue development of High Gain High Sensitivity (HGHS), leading to delivery of Engineering Development Models (EDM) and their integration and testing for the Block 1B3 upgrade. The contract also includes Full Rate Production (FRP) of the SEWIP Block 1B2 upgrade which deploys integrated Specific Emitter Identification (SEI), network centric and mission planning capabilities. Work under this award will be performed in Fairfax, Va.
High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding
Source: US Government Accountability Office
Delivering ships on time and within budget are imperatives in commercial shipbuilding. To ensure design and construction of a ship can be executed as planned, commercial shipbuilders and buyers do not move forward until critical knowledge is attained.
Before a contract is signed, a full understanding of the effort needed to design and construct the ship is reached, enabling the shipbuilder to sign a contract that fixes the price, delivery date, and ship performance parameters.
To minimize risk, buyers and shipbuilders reuse previous designs to the extent possible and attain an in-depth understanding of new technologies included in the ship design. Before construction begins, shipbuilders complete key design phases that correspond with the completion of a three-dimensional product model. Final information on the systems that will be installed on the ship is needed to allow design work to proceed. During construction, buyers maintain a presence in the shipyard and at key suppliers to ensure the ship meets quality expectations and is delivered on schedule.
Navy programs often do not employ these best practices. Ambitious requirements are set and substantial investments made in technology development, but often the Navy does not afford sufficient time to fully mature technology. New designs often make little use of prior ship designs.
As a result, a full understanding of the effort needed to execute a program is rarely achieved at the time a design and construction contract is negotiated. This in turn leads the Navy and its shipbuilders to rely on cost-reimbursable contracts (rather than fixed-price contracts) that largely leave the Navy responsible for cost growth. Complete information on the systems that will be installed on the ship may not be available, leading to changes that ripple through the design as knowledge grows. Starting construction without a stable design is a common practice and the resulting volatility leads to costly out-of-sequence work and rework.
These inefficient practices cause Navy ships to cost more than they otherwise should, reducing the number of ships that can be bought under constrained budgets. The Navy’s in-house capability to oversee design and construction has eroded, and it has been slow to build capacity to support new programs. Congress has recently encouraged greater technology maturity and design stability at key points, but required reporting does not directly address completion of a three-dimensional product model.
Differences in commercial and Navy practices reflect the incentives of their divergent business models. Commercial shipbuilding is structured on shared priorities between buyer and shipbuilder, a healthy industrial base, and maintaining in-house expertise. The need to sustain profitability incentivizes disciplined practices in the commercial model. In Navy shipbuilding, the buyer favors the introduction of new technologies on lead ships—often at the expense of other competing demands—including fleet size.
This focus—along with low volume, a relative lack of shipyard competition, and insufficient expertise—contributes to high-risk practices in Navy programs. Further, the consequences of delayed deliveries and cost growth are not as severe in Navy programs because of the use of cost-reimbursable contracts.
GAO suggests Congress consider refining required reporting to include additional design stability metrics. GAO is also making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving shipbuilding programs by balancing requirements and resources early, retiring technical risk and stabilizing design at key points, moving to fixed-price contracts for lead ships, evaluating in-house management capability, and assessing if the desired fleet size sufficiently constrains the cost and technical content of new ships.
The Department of Defense agreed with five recommendations and partially agreed with two. GAO believes all recommendations remain valid.
Photo of the Day
Members of the air department aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) pose for a group photo while en route back to homeport at Naval Station Norfolk.
Gator
