Battle of Midway
from the Naval History and Heritage Command
Preparations for Battle, March 1942 to 4 June 1942 – Overview
By March 1942, Japanese Navy strategists had achieved their initial war goals much more easily than expected. They had therefore abandoned the prewar plan to then transition to a strategic defensive posture, but there was still dispute on how to maintain the offensive. Moving further south in the Pacific would isolate Australia, and possibly remove that nation as a threat to the freshly-expanded Japanese Empire.
However, the American island base at Midway was also an attractive target, and the Doolittle Raid on Japan prompted a decision to attack there as the next major offensive goal. Midway was a vital "sentry for Hawaii", and a serious assault on it would almost certainly produce a major naval battle, a battle that the Japanese confidently expected to win. That victory would eliminate the U.S. Pacific fleet as an important threat, perhaps leading to the negotiated peace that was Japan's Pacific War "exit strategy".
The Japanese planned a three-pronged attack to capture Midway in early June, plus a simultaneous operation in the North Pacific's Aleutian Islands that might provide a useful strategic diversion. In the van of the assault would be Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's aircraft carrier force, which would approach from the northwest, supress Midway's defenses and provide long-range striking power for dealing with American warships. A few hundred miles behind Nagumo would come a battleship force under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto that would contain most of the operation's heavy gun power. Coming in from the West and Southwest, forces under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo would actually capture Midway. Kondo's battleships and cruisers represented additional capabilities for fighting a surface action.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, two things went wrong even before the Midway operation began. Two of Nagumo's six carriers were sent on a mission that resulted in the Battle of Coral Sea. One was badly damaged, and the other suffered heavy casualties to her air group. Neither would be available for Midway.
Even more importantly, thanks to an historic feat of radio communications interception and codebreaking, the United States knew its enemy's plans in detail: his target, his order of battle and his schedule. When the battle opened, the U.S. Pacific fleet would have three carriers waiting, plus a strong air force and reinforced ground defenses at the Midway Base.
U.S. Forces Assemble for Action, 26 May - 3 June 1942
By mid-May 1942 U.S. Pacific Fleet codebreakers, directed by Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, were reporting that the Japanese planned to attack somewhere in the Hawaiian area, as well as in the Aleutians. The carrier Yorktown (CV-5), damaged earlier in the month at the Battle of Coral sea, was already on the way back to Pearl Harbor for repairs. Now, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet's commander, recalled his other operational carrier group, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's Task Force 16 (TF-16), which had gone to the South Pacific after it launched the Doolittle raid on 18 April.
Halsey's two carriers, Enterprise (CV-6) and Hornet (CV-8)., arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 May, by which time intelligence was certain that Midway was the Japanese target. Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance relieved the ailing Halsey in command, as TF-16 busily got ready to steam the thousand miles up to the Midway area.
When it left port on 28 May, the damaged Yorktown was receiving urgent repairs. In a remarkable feat, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard workers had her ready in time to sail with Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's Task Force 17 (TF-17) on the 30th. Yorktown received a new air group, formerly belonging to USS Saratoga (CV-3), though some elements of her previous air squadrons remained on board.
These late May departures beat the Japanese to the punch. They had planned to place submarines to watch for an American sortie from Pearl Harbor, but didn't expect that to happen so soon, and the Japanese subs were not yet on station. Admiral Nimitz, whose intelligence had given him the enemy's plans, took care to cover Midway and its approaches with a strong force of his own submarines.
After refueling at sea, TF-16 and TF-17 rendezvoused some three hundred miles northeast of Midway on 2 June and prepared to meet the Japanese. Search flights were sent out to guard against unexpected developments. Spruance and Fletcher planned to operate their forces separately, though never very far apart. Their presence unsuspected by the enemy, they were in position to make a surprise flank attack on the Japanese carrier force when it came into range two days later.
Scouting and Early Attacks from Midway, 3-4 June 1942
Forewarned by Pacific Fleet codebreaking, Midway's patrol planes searched out hundreds of miles along probable Japanese approach routes. First contact was made with a pair of minesweepers some 470 miles to the west southwest at about 0900 on 3 June 1942. Within a half-hour, another PBY spotted the enemy's transport group, heading east about 700 miles west of Midway. Later that day, six Army B-17s bombed the transports, the Battle of Midway's first combat action, but only achieved near-misses. The Japanese were undeterred.
During the evening, four PBY-5A amphibians took off to make a night torpedo strike. Encountering the Japanese transport force in the early hours of 4 June, the slow patrol planes hit the oiler Akebono Maru with one torpedo, the only successful U.S. aerial torpedo attack of the entire battle. However, the damaged Japanese ship was able to keep up as the formation continued on.
Soon after 0530 on the morning of 4 June, about 200 miles northwest of Midway, a PBY reported the first contact with the Japanese carrier force, which had already launched over a hundred bombers and fighters to attack the American base. These were seen by another PBY several minutes later. The patrol planes' warnings prompted Midway to get all its aircraft in the air and to bring its defenses to full readiness. They also told the U.S. carrier task forces the enemy's approximate location and course, vital information sent from beyond the normal scouting range of the carriers' own planes. The Battle of Midway now began in earnest.
Japanese Air Attack on Midway, 4 June 1942
At 0430 in the morning of 4 June 1942, while 240 miles northwest of Midway, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's four carriers began launching 108 planes to attack the U.S. base there. Unknown to the Japanese, three U.S. carriers were steaming 215 miles to the east. The two opposing fleets sent out search planes, the Americans to locate an enemy they knew was there and the Japanese as a matter of operational prudence. Seaplanes from Midway were also patrolling along the expected enemy course. One of these spotted, and reported, the Japanese carrier striking force at about 0530.
That seaplane also reported the incoming Japanese planes, and radar confirmed the approaching attack shortly thereafter. Midway launched its own planes. Navy, Marine and Army bombers headed off to attack the Japanese fleet. Midway's Marine Corps Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) intercepted the enemy formation at about 0615. However, the Marines were immediately engaged by an overwhelming force of Japanese "Zero" fighters and were able to shoot down only a few of the enemy bombers, while suffering great losses themselves. This action convincingly demonstrated the inferiority of the Americans' Brewster F2A-3 "Buffalo" fighter, and the marginal capabilities of the somewhat better Grumman F4F "Wildcat", when confronted by the fast and nimble "Zero". Among the Marine losses was VMF-221's commanding officer, Major Floyd B. Parks.
The Japanese planes hit Midway's two inhabited islands at 0630. Twenty minutes of bombing and straffing knocked out some facilities on Eastern Island, but did not disable the airfield there. Sand Island's oil tanks, seaplane hangar and other buildings were set afire or otherwise damaged. As the Japanese flew back toward their carriers the attack commander, Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, radioed ahead that another air strike was required to adequately soften up Midway's defenses for invasion.
U.S. Attacks on the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, 4 June 1942 – Overview
While their aviators flew back from Midway, the Japanese carriers received several counterstrikes from Midway's own planes. Faced with overwhelming fighter opposition, these uncoordinated efforts suffered severe losses and hit nothing but sea water. Shortly after 0700, torpedo attacks were made by six Navy TBF-1s and four Army Air Force B-26s. Between 0755 and 0820, two groups of Marine Corps bombers and a formation of Army B-17s came in. The only positive results were photographs of three Japanese carriers taken by the high-flying B-17s, the sole surviving photos of the day's attacks on the Japanese carriers.
Meanwhile, a tardy Japanese scout plane had spotted the U.S. fleet and, just as Midway's counterattacks were ending, reported the presence of a carrier. Japanese commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo had begun rearming his second group of planes for another strike on Midway. He now had to reload the aircraft with anti-ship weapons, recover the planes returning from Midway and reorganize his flight decks to launch an attack on the U.S. ships. Nagumo's force barely missed having enough time.
In the hour after about 0930, U.S. Navy planes from the carriers Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktown made a series of attacks, initially by three squadrons of TBD torpedo planes that, despite nearly total losses, made no hits. The sacrifice of the TBDs did slow Japanese preparations for their own strike and disorganized the defending fighters. Then, at about 1025, everything changed. Three squadrons of SBD scout bombers, two from Enterprise and one from Yorktown, almost simultaneously dove on three of the four Japanese carriers, whose decks were crowded with fully armed and fueled planes that were just starting to take off. In a few minutes, Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were ablaze and out of action.
Of the once-overwhelming Japanese carrier force, only Hiryu remained operational. A few hours later, her planes crippled USS Yorktown. By the end of the day, though, U.S. carrier planes found and bombed Hiryu. Deprived of useful air cover, and after several hours of shocked indecision, Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto called off the Midway operation and retreated. Six months after it began, Japan's great Pacific War offensive was over.
After the 4 June mid-morning U.S. Navy attacks on the Japanese carrier force, only the Hiryu remained operational. Shortly before 1100 she launched eighteen dive bombers, escorted by six fighters, to strike a retaliatory blow. At about noon, as these planes approached USS Yorktown (CV-5), the most exposed of the three American aircraft carriers, they were intercepted by the U.S. combat air patrol, which shot down most of the bombers. Seven, however, survived to attack, hitting Yorktown with three bombs and stopping her.
While Yorktown's crew worked to repair damage and get their ship underway, a second force left Hiryu, this one consisting of ten torpedo planes and six fighters. Though the U.S. carrier was moving again by 1430, and even launched more fighters, the Japanese aircraft penetrated heavy air and gunfire opposition to hit Yorktown with two torpedoes, opening a huge hole on her midships port side. The stricken ship again went dead in the water and took on a severe list. Concerned that she was about to roll over, her Captain ordered his crew to abandon ship.
Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of dive bombers (including 10 bombers from Yorktown). This delivered a killing blow, leaving Hiryū ablaze, despite being defended by a strong defensive cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters. Vice Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, costing Japan perhaps her best carrier sailor. Hornet's strike, launching late because of a communications error, concentrated on the remaining escort ships, but failed to score any hits.
As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell. Fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces, Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight.
For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, a cruiser raiding force was detached to bombard the island. The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance's decision to briefly withdraw eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general retirement to the west.
American search planes failed to detect the retiring Japanese task forces on 5 June. An afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to order Enterprise and Hornet to turn on searchlights in order to aid their landings.
At 02:15 on 5 June–6 June, Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying some 90 nm (165 km) west of Midway, made the second of the Submarine Force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome. Sighting several ships, he (along with his exec, Ray Spruance, Jr.) could not identify them (and feared they might be friendly, so he held fire), but reported their presence, omitting their course. This went to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), and from him through Nimitz to the senior Spruance. Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent problem since PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance presumed this was the invasion force. Thus, he moved to block it, taking station some 100 nm (185 km) northeast of Midway; this frustrated Yamamoto's efforts, and the night passed without any contact between the opposing forces.
Actually, this was Yamamoto's bombardment group of four cruisers and two destroyers, which at 02:55 was ordered to retire west with the rest of his force. Tambor was sighted around the same time; turning to avoid, Mogami and Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage to Mogami's bow, the most any of the eighteen submarines deployed for the battle achieved. Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was a hazard, and he dived to approach for an attack. This was unsuccessful, and at around 06:00, he finally reported two Mogami-class cruisers, westbound, placing Spruance at least 100 nm (185 km) out of position. It may have been fortunate Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including Yamato, in the dark, his cruisers would have been overwhelmed, and his carriers helpless.
Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several successive strikes against the stragglers. Mikuma was eventually sunk, while Mogami survived severe damage to return home for repairs. Captain Richard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his attack on Mikuma.
Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo, until late afternoon on 6 June when Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes from Japanese submarine I-168 . There were few casualties aboard Yorktown, since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo also struck and sank the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two with the loss of 80 lives. Most of the lives lost were due her own depth charges exploding. Yorktown lingered until just after 6:00am on 7 June.
