Hell they didn't even make a "Jutland" movie!
But I have to agree its the BB battle since then!
Ron

Wow... Kenny, loads of information.

I have the Osprey book on the Leyte Gulf and even that does not go into that much info on the ships involved.

ps. don't forget the BPF carried out diversionary raids at the reluctant approval of Nimitz (saw the Pacific as a US theater of war) after he would not allow the BFP to participate in the landings.

(Books not infront of me may have the name wrong, correct me if I'm wrong)

Ciao
Luciano

pps Would love to see a film made of this battle and Jutland, had to stick Midway in the DVD player yesterday.

This is the day you all have been waiting for.

The first shots.

Kurita intended to pass through the narrow passage between the island of Palawan and the shallow part of the South China Sea known on the maps as “dangerous area”, then enter the Sibuyan Sea, and finally pass through San Bernardino Strait and south along the coast of the island of Samar, into Leyte Gulf. So far so good – but events would turn out much more problematic than Kurita anticipated.
The first disaster was partially of his own making. Passing the Palawan Passage, he utilized an odd five-column formation that could neither serve as screen, nor battle formation, and actually put half the destroyers of his formation inside his battleships – how he supposed to defend himself in that formation, is impossible to discern, and how, as Admiral Ugaki Matome indicates, the Japanese could have regarded this as a formation against submarines, is, too.
Events would prove that there was little protection from submarines. Shortly after midnight on the 23rd, the submarines Darter and Dace, sent to cover the Palawan Passage, noted the impressive contact that Kurita’s force made on the greenish screens of the SJ-radars of the two U.S. subs. As usual during such major operations, the first priority was to radio a contact report to the fleet; that, Commander Dave McClintock did quickly. Then, the two submarines parted and prepared for attack.
On Yamato, Vice-Admiral Ugaki’s flagship, the radio room had intercepted Darter’s message to the U.S. fleet and correctly recognized it as being close; inexplicably, no change whatsoever was made in the Japanese formation. Thus, when Darter fired her first six torpedoes on the flagship Atago and four more on Takao, no one in the Japanese fleet was prepared for what was going to happen.
Darter’s shots were well timed. Four ripped open Atago from stem to stern; she capsized and sank in twenty minutes, fortunately not taking Admiral Kurita down with her. Takao was heavily damaged. As she witnessed the scene, Dace was presented with a perfect shot at the other heavy-ship column; four torpedoes from her salvo blew up heavy cruiser Maya; only the lack of torpedoes in her aft tubes prevented even more devastation. She retired, fearing having gone to close for comfort and being sure of having sunk a battleship. The same did Darter; the Japanese, meanwhile, were too busy surviving to care much for their U.S. assailants.
While Kurita was fished from the water and moved by destroyer to battleship Yamato, cruiser Takao and two destroyers were sent back to care to Takao’s wounds.
As the two U.S. submarines stalked wounded Takao throughout the day and into the night, there seemed little chance the heavy cruiser would come home without further damage. Luck, however, would not have it. Shortly after midnight with terrific noise, Darter ran aground on an uncharted reef, and would not come loose. Finally, Commander McClintock asked Dace for assistance. The other sub took off Darter’s crew and commenced attempts to destroy the wreck. However, although the boat was riddled by 5-inch fire, she did not blow up. The next day, a Japanese destroyer came alongside and took off again with valuable information, blueprints of radar and engine systems, and various other material. Although the code books and other highly classified material had been burned, the take was still not to be regarded lightly.
Meantime, the Imperial Japanese forces entered the Sibuyan Sea, closing their certain encounter with U.S. air power.

Gator

Luciano, news about the British sounds about right. Nimitz already had the burden of dealing with MacArthur, and then to have the Royal Navy want to be part of the action I'm sure was something he didn't want to deal with. The Americans and Brits clashed several times in both theaters over the proper use of the naval forces. Ahhh, egos are another part of the colorful history of WW2.

later...Gator

That is interesting generally when we think about Anglo-American squabbles during the war it all focuses on Montgomery and Patton. We Americans have a real bad tendency to forget any other involvement in the Pacfic .

The news from the central Pacific.

Today, at about 08:00 , the Japanese Center Force was spotted entering the narrow Sibuyan Sea by planes from USS Intrepid.

260 planes from carriers Intrepid and Cabot of Task Group 38.2 attacked at about 10:30, scoring hits on Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging Myōkō. The second wave of planes concentrated on Musashi, scoring many direct hits with bombs and torpedoes. As she retreated, listing to port, a third wave from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with eleven bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the planes, passing the crippled Musashi as he retreated. He waited until 17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino Strait. Musashi finally rolled over and sank at about 19:30.


Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air Fleet of 80 planes based on Luzon against the carriers Essex, Lexington, Princeton and Langley of Task Group 38.3 (whose planes were being used to attack airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land based aircraft attacks on the Allied ships in the Leyte Gulf). Princeton was hit by an armour-piercing bomb and burst into flames. At 15:30 the aft magazine exploded, killing 200 sailors on Princeton and 80 on the cruiser Birmingham which was alongside assisting with the firefighting. Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire, and other nearby vessels were damaged too. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and she sank at 17:50.

Now that the opening shots have been fired, the night of the 24th and the early morning of the 25th of October bring on the last hoorah of the battleship.

The Japanese Southern force consisted of two independent groups, Nishimura's group including its two elderly battleships, and a smaller group under Admiral Shima. Both of these were sighted by American aircraft on the morning of the 24th., and Admiral Kinkaid, correctly surmising that these groups would attempt to attack the Leyte anchorage through Surigao Strait, was preparing to repel them. The Seventh Fleet had more than enough strength, in its battleships, cruisers and destroyers, to deal with the Southern Force.
The Japanese decoy force (the Northern Force) had remained undiscovered by the Americans until late on the 24th, but one of its search aircraft had located Sherman's Task Group Three at 0820. At 1145 Ozawa's carriers launched a strike consisting of 76 aircraft which failed to inflict any damage on Sherman's group. The Japanese pilots were so poorly trained that they could not return to their carriers but had to make for airfields
on Luzon after conducting their attack.
Halsey suspected that Japanese carriers were nearby, partly because the aircraft which had attacked Group Three in the morning were of carrier type (although these aircraft were in fact land-based). Air searches were conducted to the north and north-east but did not find Ozawa's battleships until 1540, and did not find the enemy carriers until an hour later.

Halsey's Blunder
Having located the Japanese carriers - which he regarded as both the main threat and the main prize - Halsey decided to concentrate his three available carrier groups, with all their accompanying vessels - including the six fast battleships - steam northwards with all this huge force, and annihilate Ozawa's ships during daylight on 25 October.
Halsey took no steps to protect Seventh Fleet from the Centre Force. Third Fleet left San Bernadino Strait entirely unguarded.
As C. Vann Woodward writes "Everything was pulled out from San Bernadino Strait. Not so much as a picket destroyer was left."
Moreover Halsey did not even inform Kinkaid that the Strait was NOT now being covered by the Third Fleet - instead the Seventh Fleet commander had to rely on an intercepted signal, timed 2022, from Halsey to his task group commanders, which indicated that the Third Fleet commander was going north with the three carrier groups to strike the enemy Northern Force.
Seventh Fleet had intercepted an earlier radio signal from Halsey which outlined a plan to form Task Force 34 - a very powerful surface force built around the Third Fleet's fast battleships, which was to be commanded by Vice Admiral Willis Lee.
When Halsey's 2022 message was received, Kinkaid and his staff, in the light of the intercepted "Task Force 34 will be formed . . ." signal, and not envisaging for a moment that the Third Fleet commander would allow the Japanese Centre Force to emerge from San Bernadino Strait entirely unopposed, assumed that the "three groups" referred to were the carrier groups of Third Fleet, and that Task Force 34 had been left behind to guard San Bernadino Strait.
In fact Task Force 34 had not yet been formed, and all the ships which it was expected to contain were heading northwards with the American carriers. Meanwhile the Seventh Fleet, unconcerned about any threat from its northern quarter, and feeling fully confident that the Centre Force would be dealt with by Halsey and the Third Fleet, continued with its preparations to meet the Japanese Southern Force in Surigao Strait.



The Battle of Surigao Strait 2300 October 24 - 0721 October 25
Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, with 6 old slow battleships (five of which had been sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor), 4 heavy and 4 light cruisers, and 26 destroyers, was charged with the task of stopping the Japanese Southern Force in Surigao Strait.
In addition 39 PT boats (motor torpedo-boats) were deployed beyond the Strait. At 2236 one of these, PT-131, made the first contact with the advancing Japanese ships. Over more than three-and-a-half hours the PT boats made repeated attacks on Nishimura's force, but without making any torpedo hits. Nonetheless they made contact reports which were of great assistance to Oldendorf's forces.
As Nishimura's ships entered Surigao Strait they came under devastating torpedo attack from American destroyers disposed on both sides of their line of advance. Both Japanese battleships were hit. The Yamashiro was able to steam onwards, but the Fuso blew up and sank. Three of the Van Force's four destroyers were also hit. Two of these sank, but the third, the Asagumo, was able to retire.
The American destroyer attacks were so successful that when the Japanese force came within range of the batteships and cruisers disposed across the Strait all it consisted of was the battleshipYamashiro, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. The overwhelming gunfire of the Allied ships sank the Yamashiro and reduced the cruiser - Mogami - to a blazing wreck, but the destroyer, the Shigure, miraculously survived.
The rear of the Southern Force, the "Second Striking Force" commanded by Vice Admiral Shima, had approached Surigao Strait about 40 miles astern of Nishimura. It too came under attack from the PT boats, and one of these hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo which crippled her and caused her to fall out of formation. Shima next encountered remnants of Nishimura's force, including what he took to be the burning Fuso and Yamashiro but what were in fact the broken halves of the torpedoed Fuso. Shima, much discouraged, decided to withdraw, after which his flagship Nachi collided with the burning Mogami and was badly damaged. Mogami was later sunk by aircraft from the Seventh Fleet's escort carriers.
Oldendorf's force and the PT boats then harried the retreating Japanese. The last shots of the Surigao Strait battle were fired at 0721 when US cruisers and destroyers sank the destroyer Asagumo, torpedoed and damaged earlier in the battle.
At 0723 Oldendorf recalled his light forces from the pursuit.
Less than ten minutes later he received the astounding report that the Seventh Fleet's escort carriers had been surprised by the Japanese main force off Samar and were under heavy attack, a report which meant that the invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf - and the entire Leyte operation itself - was now in great danger.

Tomorrow, the gallant defense of Taffy 3 and the last stand of the tin cans.

Hi Kenny,

Thanks for the latest installment.

Al

While this battle also took place on the 25th, I felt it important to post it seperately.

The Battle off Samar - the Main Action
Seventh Fleet contained a large task group of eighteen escort carriers, divided into three task units of six carriers each.
The main duties of these ships were the provision of combat air patrol over the Leyte beachhead and the invasion shipping, ground attack on Leyte, and anti-submarine patrol. They and their air groups were not trained or equipped to fight an enemy fleet.
At dawn on the 25 October the Seventh Fleet's three escort carrier units were operating off the east coast of Samar. In accounts of the battle these units are generally referred to by their radio call-signs "Taffy One", "Taffy Two" and (the most northerly of the three - Task Unit 77.4.3) "Taffy Three." This last unit, under the command of Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, had by shortly after 0600 launched 12 fighters and also an anti-
submarine patrol of 6 aircraft to cover the ships in Leyte Gulf, as well as aircraft for Taffy Three's own protection.
It was therefore a very routine morning so far for Taffy Three. The threat from the Japanese Southern Force had been eliminated by Oldendorf's force during the previous night, and Halsey's Third Fleet with its immense strength lay to the north between the escort carriers and the Japanese Central and Northern forces. Or so Clifton Sprague and the men of Taffy Three believed.
But at 0645 AA fire was seen to the north-west, and a minute later the carrier Fanshaw Bay picked up a surface contact on radar.
At 0647 Ensign Jensen - the pilot of a plane from carrier Kadashan Bay - sighted, and then attacked, Japanese ships which he with remarkable accuracy identified as 4 battleships and 8 cruisers accompanied by destroyers.
Then, just before 7am, lookouts on the escort carriers saw the masts and fighting-tops of Japanese battleships and cruisers appear above the northern horizon. A minute later heavy shells began falling near Taffy Three.
The surprise was complete. Taffy Three was in a desperate situation, facing an exceptionally powerful force which also had a great superiority in speed over the escort carriers, while the only ships which Clifton Sprague had available to protect his flattops were the three destroyers and four destroyer escorts of his screen.
At 0657 Sprague had turned his carriers due east, begun working them up to their maximum speed of seventeen-and-a-half knots, ordered all his ships to lay smoke, and started to launch every available aircraft. At 0701 he issued a contact report and a call for assistance from anyone able to give it.
Japanese lookouts had sighted the escort carriers at 0644 when Kurita's ships were deploying from column into a circular anti-aircraft disposition.
Admiral Kurita then ordered "General Attack," permitting his ships' commanding officers to deploy against the US ships on their own inititative and without referring to the flagship. This was to mean that he lost control of the battle, and his giving such an order when his force was already engaged in redeployment caused immense confusion within the Japanese formation.
Shortly after the battle began Taffy Three's carriers entered a rain squall which protected them for about fifteen minutes and enabled Sprague to bring them around to the south-west - i.e. towards Leyte Gulf and the rest of Seventh Fleet.
At 0716 Sprague ordered his three Fletcher-class destroyers - Hoel, Heermann and Johnston - to counter-attack the Japanese formation. This they did with remarkable heroism and tenacity. They unflinchingly took on the battleships and cruisers, engaging these heavy ships with their 5-inch guns as well as their torpedoes.
At about 0750 the American destroyer escorts with equal heroism joined the counter-attack. At 0754 the vast battleship Yamato, now serving as Kurita's flagship after the sinking of Atago on 23 October, was forced to turn away for ten minutes by torpedoes from the American destroyers and was never able to get back into the action.
A very confused struggle by the DDs and DEs against the Japanese force continued for over two hours. By 0945 the Hoel and Johnston, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, had been sunk by Japanese gunfire. At least one torpedo hit was made on Kurita's ships, and probably more, but what was of much greater importance was that the Japanese heavy ships had been forced into repeated evasive action and that this had slowed their advance, caused increasing confusion in the already badly disorganised Japanese formation, and deprived Kurita of any chance of regaining effective control of his force.
While the small ships of Clifton Sprague's screen were conducting these desperate counter-attacks the Japanese ships were also subjected to incessant assaults by aircraft from the three Taffies. Many of these attacks were carried out by aircraft armed with weapons intended for ground support and quite unsuited for attack on large warships, and many others were dummy attacks by unarmed aircraft.
Nonetheless, with the weapons available to them, the aircraft succeeded in sinking three heavy cruisers and damaging several other ships. These air attacks also played a vital role in support of the destroyers and DEs in distracting the enemy ships from the escort carriers, forcing them into evasive manoevres, and disorganizing the Japanese formation.
Despite all these heroic efforts the escort carrier Gambier Bay was eventually hit repeatedly by 8-inch gunfire, was crippled, and sank at 0907.
But then, entirely unexpectedly, and although his cruisers and destroyers were now on the verge of annihilating Taffy Three, Kurita at 0911 ordered his ships to break off action.
As Clifton Sprague later recalled -
"At 0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when I heard one of the signalmen yell 'Goddamit, boys, they're getting away!' I could not believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time."
While Taffy Three was fighting Kurita's ships, Taffy One was being subjected to the first organized kamikaze attack of the war. Later that morning Taffy Three itself was attacked by kamikazes. At about 1100 the escort carrier St. Lo was crashed by a Zero which caused a series of explosions, and she sank at 1125. Four more of the Seventh Fleet's escort carriers were damaged by kamikaze attack during 25 October.
Meanwhile, far to the north, Third Fleet was attacking the Japanese decoy force in the Battle off Cape Engano.
The Battle off Samar - the Main Action
Seventh Fleet contained a large task group of eighteen escort carriers, divided into three task units of six carriers each.
The main duties of these ships were the provision of combat air patrol over the Leyte beachhead and the invasion shipping, ground attack on Leyte, and anti-submarine patrol. They and their air groups were not trained or equipped to fight an enemy fleet.
At dawn on the 25 October the Seventh Fleet's three escort carrier units were operating off the east coast of Samar. In accounts of the battle these units are generally referred to by their radio call-signs "Taffy One", "Taffy Two" and (the most northerly of the three - Task Unit 77.4.3) "Taffy Three." This last unit, under the command of Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, had by shortly after 0600 launched 12 fighters and also an anti-
submarine patrol of 6 aircraft to cover the ships in Leyte Gulf, as well as aircraft for Taffy Three's own protection.
It was therefore a very routine morning so far for Taffy Three. The threat from the Japanese Southern Force had been eliminated by Oldendorf's force during the previous night, and Halsey's Third Fleet with its immense strength lay to the north between the escort carriers and the Japanese Central and Northern forces. Or so Clifton Sprague and the men of Taffy Three believed.
But at 0645 AA fire was seen to the north-west, and a minute later the carrier Fanshaw Bay picked up a surface contact on radar.
At 0647 Ensign Jensen - the pilot of a plane from carrier Kadashan Bay - sighted, and then attacked, Japanese ships which he with remarkable accuracy identified as 4 battleships and 8 cruisers accompanied by destroyers.
Then, just before 7am, lookouts on the escort carriers saw the masts and fighting-tops of Japanese battleships and cruisers appear above the northern horizon. A minute later heavy shells began falling near Taffy Three.
The surprise was complete. Taffy Three was in a desperate situation, facing an exceptionally powerful force which also had a great superiority in speed over the escort carriers, while the only ships which Clifton Sprague had available to protect his flattops were the three destroyers and four destroyer escorts of his screen.
At 0657 Sprague had turned his carriers due east, begun working them up to their maximum speed of seventeen-and-a-half knots, ordered all his ships to lay smoke, and started to launch every available aircraft. At 0701 he issued a contact report and a call for assistance from anyone able to give it.
Japanese lookouts had sighted the escort carriers at 0644 when Kurita's ships were deploying from column into a circular anti-aircraft disposition.
Admiral Kurita then ordered "General Attack," permitting his ships' commanding officers to deploy against the US ships on their own inititative and without referring to the flagship. This was to mean that he lost control of the battle, and his giving such an order when his force was already engaged in redeployment caused immense confusion within the Japanese formation.
Shortly after the battle began Taffy Three's carriers entered a rain squall which protected them for about fifteen minutes and enabled Sprague to bring them around to the south-west - i.e. towards Leyte Gulf and the rest of Seventh Fleet.
At 0716 Sprague ordered his three Fletcher-class destroyers - Hoel, Heermann and Johnston - to counter-attack the Japanese formation. This they did with remarkable heroism and tenacity. They unflinchingly took on the battleships and cruisers, engaging these heavy ships with their 5-inch guns as well as their torpedoes.
At about 0750 the American destroyer escorts with equal heroism joined the counter-attack. At 0754 the vast battleship Yamato, now serving as Kurita's flagship after the sinking of Atago on 23 October, was forced to turn away for ten minutes by torpedoes from the American destroyers and was never able to get back into the action.
A very confused struggle by the DDs and DEs against the Japanese force continued for over two hours. By 0945 the Hoel and Johnston, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, had been sunk by Japanese gunfire. At least one torpedo hit was made on Kurita's ships, and probably more, but what was of much greater importance was that the Japanese heavy ships had been forced into repeated evasive action and that this had slowed their advance, caused increasing confusion in the already badly disorganised Japanese formation, and deprived Kurita of any chance of regaining effective control of his force.
While the small ships of Clifton Sprague's screen were conducting these desperate counter-attacks the Japanese ships were also subjected to incessant assaults by aircraft from the three Taffies. Many of these attacks were carried out by aircraft armed with weapons intended for ground support and quite unsuited for attack on large warships, and many others were dummy attacks by unarmed aircraft.
Nonetheless, with the weapons available to them, the aircraft succeeded in sinking three heavy cruisers and damaging several other ships. These air attacks also played a vital role in support of the destroyers and DEs in distracting the enemy ships from the escort carriers, forcing them into evasive manoevres, and disorganizing the Japanese formation.
Despite all these heroic efforts the escort carrier Gambier Bay was eventually hit repeatedly by 8-inch gunfire, was crippled, and sank at 0907.
But then, entirely unexpectedly, and although his cruisers and destroyers were now on the verge of annihilating Taffy Three, Kurita at 0911 ordered his ships to break off action.
As Clifton Sprague later recalled -
"At 0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when I heard one of the signalmen yell 'Goddamit, boys, they're getting away!' I could not believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time."
While Taffy Three was fighting Kurita's ships, Taffy One was being subjected to the first organized kamikaze attack of the war. Later that morning Taffy Three itself was attacked by kamikazes. At about 1100 the escort carrier St. Lo was crashed by a Zero which caused a series of explosions, and she sank at 1125. Four more of the Seventh Fleet's escort carriers were damaged by kamikaze attack during 25 October.
Meanwhile, far to the north, Third Fleet was attacking the Japanese decoy force in the Battle off Cape Engano.

Here is an awesome web site on Taffy 3 .

Memorial to Adm. Sprague and Taffy 3

Tomorrow, the Battle of Cape Engano.

Thanks Kenny,

A little light bed time reading :-) :-)

Al

Here's the final installment, but, because of the positive response, I'll post info on various ships starting Sunday.

The Battle of Cape Engano
Shortly before midnight 24 October Halsey's three available carrier groups made rendezvous off Luzon and began a high-speed run northwards to strike the Japanese Northern Force at daybreak. Halsey now passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Vice Admiral Mitscher.
During the run northward the ships which were to make up Task Force 34 were detached from the carrier groups and Task Force 34 was officially formed at 0240 October 25, with Vice Admiral Lee as Officer in Tactical Command. This force swept northwards in the van of the carrier groups. Halsey's intention was that they would follow up with gunfire the carriers' attacks on Ozawa's ships.
At 0430 Mitscher ordered his carriers to begin arming their first deckloads and to be ready to launch aircraft at first light. He in fact launched his first attack groups, 180 aircraft in all, before the Northern Force had been located, and had them orbitting ahead of his carrier force while he was waiting for the first contact reports to come in from his search aircraft.
The first contact came at 0710. At 0800 Third Fleet's attacks on Ozawa began, meeting little opposition. Task Force 38's air strikes continued until the evening, by which time Mitscher's aircraft had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, had sunk Ozawa's flagship Zuikaku (last survivor of the six carriers which had launched the attack on Pearl Harbor) and two of the three light carriers, crippled the remaining light carrier, and sunk a destroyer, aswell as damaging other ships.
Meanwhile, at 0822 when Mitscher's second strike was approaching the Northern Force Halsey in New Jersey received an urgent signal in plain language from Kinkaid saying that the Seventh Fleet escort carriers were under attack off Samar and that assistance from Third Fleet's heavy ships was desperately needed. This was the first of a succession of pleas for help received by Halsey, which he ignored and continued to ignore for nearly three hours, despite their including an alarming report that the Seventh Fleet battleships were low on ammunition. Halsey continued to have Task Force 34 race to the north, while the men of Taffy Three were fighting for their lives and the Leyte invasion itself was being placed in jeopardy.
At 1000 the Third Fleet Commander received a message from Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Halsey's immediate superior. The message, as handed to Admiral Halsey, read -
"WHERE IS REPEAT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR . . . THE WORLD WONDERS"
This message, indicating that Nimitz was alarmed about the safety of the Seventh Fleet and considered that the Third Fleet battleships should be in action off Samar, eventually persuaded Halsey to turn Task Force 34 around and send it south again. Rear Admiral Bogan's carrier group was also pulled out of the attack on Ozawa's force and sent south to provide air cover and support for Lee's force.
When Lee's battleships were pulled out at 1115 they were almost within gunfire range of the Japanese Northern Force.
Ironically it was by this time too late - if Halsey had turned Lee's force around when he first received Kinkaid's call for assistance the battleships and the cruisers (although not the destroyers which were low on fuel, but might in the circumstances have been left behind) could have arrived off San Bernadino Strait in time to cut off Kurita's withdrawal. As it was, Kurita's force, still containing four battleships and five heavy cruisers, had escaped through the Strait before the Third Fleet's heavy ships arrived there. All Task Force 34 could then accomplish was to sink the straggling Japanese destroyer Nowaki.
In any event, even if Task Force 34 had been turned southwards immediately after 0822, it would have arrived too late to have given any assistance to the ships of Taffy Three, other than in picking up survivors.
When the bulk of Task Force 34 was pulled out of the attack on Ozawa four of its cruisers and nine destroyers were detached under the command of Rear Admiral DuBose to proceed northward with the carriers. At 1415 Mitscher ordered DuBose to pursue Ozawa's ships. His cruisers sank the carrier Chiyoda at around 1700 and the American surface force at 2059 sank the destroyer Hatsuzuki after a stubborn fight.
At about 2310 the US submarine Jallao torpedoed and sank the light cruiser Tama of Ozawa's force. This was the end of the Battle off Cape Engano, and - apart from some final air strikes on the retreating Japanese forces on 26 October - the end of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.
The US had lost one light carrier and two escort carriers, two destroyers and a destroyer escort.
Between 23 and 26 October the Imperial Navy had lost one large carrier (the Zuikaku), three light carriers, three battleships including the giant Musashi, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and twelve destroyers.
Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, in his book "The Decisive Battles of the Western World," writes of this outcome -
"The Japanese fleet had [effectively] ceased to exist, and, except by land-based aircraft, their opponents had won undisputed command of the sea. When Admiral Ozawa was questioned on the battle after the war he replied 'After this battle the surface forces became strictly auxiliary, so that we relied on land forces, special [Kamikaze] attack, and air power . . there was no further use assigned to surface vessels, with the exception of some special ships.' And Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, said that he realised that the defeat at Leyte 'was tantamount to the loss of the Philippines.'
As for the larger significance of the battle, he said 'I felt that it was the end.' "

later...Gator

Great read Kenny.

I really appreciate the time and effort you have put in.

I have now learnt about a very significant WWII naval battle I was embarrassingly unaware of.

I am really enjoying finding out more about naval history, tactics and personalities hanging around in this great forum.

Regards

Sean

Well Sean, keep checking back. I've talked with Gunny and because of the popularity of this thread, I'll highlight as many naval battles as I can, from Nelson to today. It will take a little time to set up, but it is a go.

Gator

Kenny thank you for putting this together its been something to look forward to each day.

Good luck in putting together a 'history channel' I give you my support and offer any help I may be able to give, if limited.

While we are on this subject I thought I would just add this little item.

28 October 1944

The British submarine Trenchant launches 'Chariots' against shipping in Phuket harbour, Thailand. The naval auxiliary Sumatra Maru 984Tons is sunk.

(Now my Leyte campaign build subject)

15 Nov 1944

The British fast minelayer Ariadne, with the US destroyers Shaw and Caldwell, the DE Willmarth and 20 landing craft, transports a regiment of the 31st US Inf Div from Morotai to Pegun Island in the Mapia Group for the purpose of erecting a weather station and a Loran station.
The 200 Japanese on the Island are overwhelmed by the US troops who land after shelling by the destroyers

Ciao
Luciano

Ps whats a Loran station? anyone?

Sorry all I just thought I would add a little of the British Pacific Fleets (TF57) involvement during Leyte. (If I may Gator)

Second in Command, Admiral Power, took a section of the fleet to sea on the 15th October for strikes against the Nicobar Islands, a Japanese held group mid-way between the Andaman Islands and Sumatra. Main objective of these attacks was to cause a diversion in the hope of preventing reinforcements being transferred from the Indian Ocean theatre to the Philippines where the American assaults were about to commence. The Japanese had already committed their main resources to halt this offensive and the small blows made no difference to their dispostions, this, of course, was not known at the time.
Air attacks and bombardments were carried out between 17 - 19th Oct. Worthwhile targets were hard to find this caused frustration among the airmen, the ships gunners, too were stuck in sweltering turrets without action for days. The limited opposition signalled the complete mastery over this area.


As a side note when first forming the BPF not only included British ships but also the Free French BB Richelieu, the Dutch cruiser Tromp, the USS Saratoga and three US destroyers. The Saratoga and DD's were withdrawn in July 44 when further British carriers arrived.


Ciao
Luciano

The Battle off of Samar is truely one of the great battles of all times ranking alonside Themopolae (sp) , Roarkes Drift, the Alamo, Midway, and the Battle of the Bulge. There should be a movie of it, but it is highly unlikely as the Phillipine Sea entire action never got much publicity. I just scaned, but if you did not include the information. How many and who got Medals of Honor for this?

Ask and ye shall receive.

Presidential Unit Citation awarded to Task Unit 77.4.3 for extraordinary heroism in action against the vastly superior Japanese Navy Centre Force.

Philippines Presidential Unit Citation awarded to Task Unit 77.4.3 for acts and services of exceptional gallantry and heroism rendered by its officers and crew to the Philippines and its people during the battle off Samar, Philippines.

Medal of Honor posthumously awarded to Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN,
Commanding Officer, USS JOHNSTON (DD 557) for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty.

Navy Cross
CAPT H.L. Young, USN (Taffy II)
CDR L. S. Kintberger, USN
LCDR A.F. Beyer, Jr. USNR
LCDR R. W. Copeland, USNR
LCDR J.R. Dale, USNR (Taffy II)
LT T. B. Van Brunt, USNR
LT R.F. Adair, USN (Taffy II)
LT S.T. Bitting, USNR (Taffy II)
LTJG L. E. Waldrop, USNR
LTJG F.H. Baxter, USNR (Taffy I)
ENS W. C. Brooks, Jr. USNR
ENS R.E. Brown, USNR (Taffy I)
RADM C.A.F. SPRAGUE, USN
CDR W.D. THOMAS, USN
LCDR S. HANSEN, USNR
CDR A.T. HATHAWAY, USN
LCDR J.E. PACE, USNR
CAPT W.V.R. VIEWEG, USN
CAPT F.J. McKENNA, USN
LCDR R.M. JONES, USNR
CAPT D.P. JOHNSON, USN
LCDR R.S. ROGERS, USNR
CAPT J.P. WHITNEY, USN
CDR R.L. FOWLER, USN
RADM R.A. OFSTIE, USN
CAPT T.B. WILLIAMSON, USN
LCDR W.H. KEIGHLEY, USNR
CAPT D.J. SULLIVAN, USN
LT E.R. FICKENSCHER, USNR

SILVER STAR
GM3c Paul Henry Carr, USNR
S2c Edward "E" Dobrowolski, USNR

BRONZE STAR
S1c James "A" Gregory, USNR

Gator

One side note about the message sent to Halsey by Nimitz. Part of the Communications Security (COMSEC) practices used by the Navy during the war included inserting extra unrelated text into messages which were sent in code. The idea was that it would require additional effort to decode words which were unrelated to the text of the message. The radio operators decoding the message were supposed to "strip off" the excess words as part of the decoding process and only hand the "real message" to the recipient.

In the message which was sent, "WHERE IS REPEAT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR . . . THE WORLD WONDERS" the phrase "the world wonders" was just such a "filler". It was not part of the original text that Nimitz sent to Halsey, and was supposed to have been removed by the decoding crew before delivery of the message. I'm not sure how that exact phrase was selected, but it may have been chosen from a list of available phrases that changed by day, so the operators would know what wording to delete.

In any event the choice was unfortunate. For some reason, those words were left in the message that was handed to Halsey, and he, seeing that phrase, took great offense, and believed that Nimitz was being unduly sarcastic and insulting in his choice of words.

Tom

So true Tom. As a matter of fact, those three words soured the relationship between Halsey and Nimitz for the rest of the war, at least for Halsey.

later...Gator

Guy's I like a few of you have said, liked what Kenny (Gator) did with this touch of history in our modelling lives covering Leyte. Now I have had a look through my books and I think I could do this for the whole of the second world war.

1st. Would you guys be interested in me doing this?

2nd. I would not be able to do every day otherwise I would not get any modelling done. Although I would update when I was to next logon at home. Objections?

3rd. I was thinking to maybe start on 1st Jan 1940 (1st Jan 2007) as apart from the River plate, ship movements, mining, and stop and search not to much happened at the end of 1939.

I'm open to ideas or support/backup on this.

Kenny any input from your good self (you started something here )

Ciao
Luciano

Luciano,

Sent you a PM.

Gator