Hey guys. I though it would be interesting to keep you informed on what was going on in Leyte Gulf in 1944 during the month of October.
Today, October 13, 1944, the US Third Fleet had already begun naval bombardment and air attacks of the Philippine Islands. The Japanese had begun aerial attacks on the US fleet. Rear Admiral Masafumi Arima made the first kamikazi attack in a Betty bomber on the USS Franklin. He came in at too shallow of an angle after dropping his torpedeo and skipped across the flight deck, the Betty's props chewing up the wood deck.

I think I'm going to enjoy this thread greatly. Tell me oh exalted one....what is the source of all your wisdom

This particular bit o trivia is from the book "Lucky Lady". The story of the Franklin and Santa Fe.

On October 14, 1944, the USS Houston was hit by an aerial torpedo. While being towed to Ulithi Atoll, she was escorted by a screen of cruisers, destroyers and 2 light carriers to fend off further air attacks.

Hey guys.

By this time, the US Third Fleet were pounding Japanese airfields on Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon, as well as enemy shipping in adjacent waters. What shipping wasn't sunk by US carrer aircraft were sunk by naval gun fire from Halsy's cruisers and destroyers. A really good book is the "Lucky Lady", the story of the Franklin and Santa Fe from launching to the fateful day when the Santa Fe came to the rescue of the wounded Franklin. The author's father was a gun director on the Santa Fe. She was part of some of the early unknown gun battles between IJN and US warships leading up to the more famous actions after the landings. Remember, the battle for Leyte Gulf was for total control of the waters surrounding Luzon before and after the landings. As I find more info before the landings, I'll pass it on.

later...Gator

Keep it up Gator....

Going to enjoy reading these

Ciao
Luciano

Hi~
Have you ever read " Tin Can soldiers"
am reading that now at work!
Ouch the Yamato!!
Ron

Hey Ron, that will have to be my next read.

Ok guys. Just to catch you up, here's where we stand as of 16 October.

On the evening of 13 October the American heavy cruiser Canberra was torpedoed eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral Halsey kept his forces in the area another day in order to afford protection to the Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued against enemy aircraft, airfields, and installations. By this time, Japanese reinforcements had arrived. On the evening of 14 October an aerial torpedo hit the heavy cruiser Houston.

And as Paul Harvey says, here's the rest of the story.

Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on the damage inflicted on the two cruisers. He ordered two task groups, which included the battleships, to retire eastward out of sight; he sent another of the task groups to conduct intermittent air raids against northern Luzon; and he assigned the remaining task group to protect the crippled Canberra and Houston. Halsey instructed this last task group to send out messages in the clear begging piteously for assistance. He hoped that by this ruse, which he called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," the Japanese fleet would be led to believe that this task group was all that remained of the task force and would therefore sweep down for the kill. The two task groups which had retired eastward would then appear and engage the enemy. The Japanese swallowed the bait and dispatched destroyers and cruisers toward the "crippled" American force. Unfortunately, their search planes uncovered the two task forces off Formosa, and the Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.

The enemy pilots made such greatly exaggerated claims of success that Imperial General Headquarters decided to order out the 2nd Diversion Attack Force against the Americans. The flying units of Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 were transferred to the 2nd Air Fleet. These air units proceeded to Formosa on the 12th of October. Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, however, remained in the Inland Sea until they sortied forth for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces . . . the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout. . . ." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months.

Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy.

Good stuff.

later...Gator

Hey Gator~
You can buy it at Amazon.com

Also what is an aerial torpedo ?
Do you have any pics?
Thanks~
Ron

One dropped from a torpedo plane, that's all.

MmmHmm. . .imagine this beast coming at ya at twenty knots?!

WOW>>>>>>> I always thought that the torpedoes dropped from planes were similar in shape to the ones shot from subs....only a few feet shorter. That thing looks like a miniature buzz bomb

What you see there is the German Fritz X, a World War 2 anti-ship missile. It was irst used in combat in 1943 and used to sink the Italian battleship Roma. The HMS Warspite was hit by three Fritz Xs at the Salerno landings and survived to bombard Nomrandy. The Japanese only used regular aerial torpedoes as we know them.

Now, on to this day in Leyte Gulf.

The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was to bear the brunt of the tactical air support. By the afternoon and night of 17 October the weather had cleared, and flying conditions were perfect as the carriers moved into their operation areas the following morning. The force was divided into three units: one unit operated in the southern part of Leyte Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon Strait; another operated near the entrance to the gulf in order to support the landings of the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and the last operated southeast of Samar Island to support the landings of the Northern Attack Force at Tacloban.

later...Gator

Hi Kenny,

This is a really neat idea to run alongside the campaign.

Nice one.

Al

Thanks Alan. I thought it would be a good resource for you guys and to also serve as a catalyst for some dios. Besides, the history of this battle is too awesome not to share.

Gator

Today's news from Leyte Gulf

On 18 and 19 October, the carrier aircraft of the Seventh Fleet protected the troop convoy and struck at small vessels and airfields in northern Mindanao as well as defense and communications installations and airfields on Leyte.

One of Third Fleet's task groups launched strikes at the Leyte, Samar, Cebu, and Negros areas on 18-19 October and to deploy to provide direct air support for the Leyte operation on 20 October. Also today, news was received that the Japanese had discovered the ruse and withdrawn their warships from the Formosa area, thus leaving Third Fleet free to protect the operation by covering San Bernardino and Surigao Straits.

That's all the news that's fit to print.

The days news from the Pacific.

On 18 and 19 October, underwater demolition teams made a reconnaissance of the landing areas, accompanied by destroyers which bombarded the shores. The two days' reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or mines in the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.

By the evening of 19 October the preliminary operations were almost completed. The beaches had been surveyed and found suitable for landing; mines had been cleared from most of the main approach channel; and the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been secured.

All ships were to be prepared to attach paravanes (mine-cable cutting devices) on signal at any time after noon on 19 October. Since the mine sweepers had not sufficiently cleared the gulf, paravanes were attached preparatory to entering it. The mine sweepers were to have escorted the convoy into the area, but since they would not be ready for about two hours, the entry was ordered to be made without them. The convoy hugged the Dinagat shore line so closely that the distance from the center of the formation to the shore was only 3,800 yards. Some of the ships did not see the signal light which had been placed on Dinagat Island by the 6th Rangers and were delayed on that account.

The convoy advanced without incident toward the target area. On the 18th, Admiral Kinkaid radioed General MacArthur that the operations were going well, though the storm had somewhat delayed matters, and the General was made "welcome to our city." MacArthur in reply said that he was "glad indeed to be in your domicile and under your flag. It gives me not only confidence but a sense of inspiration," and, probably thinking of the many arduous months of planning and amphibious operations, he added, "As Ripley says believe it or not we are almost there."

As the convoy came ever closer to the target, the atmosphere aboard the vessels became more and more tense. By 1800 on 19 October most of the vessels had arrived outside the gulf. The Far Shore was now near and could be seen vaguely in the distance. On board one of the vessels Protestant and Catholic evening prayers were broadcast over the address system. Some of the men felt that it gave them a lift, but many felt that they were being administered the last rites of their church.

All vessels arrived on schedule. Because the mine barrier in the entrance had not been completely cleared, the ships entered the gulf somewhat to the south of the center of the entrance, avoiding the main channel and keeping close to the northern point of Dinagat Island. Fears that strong ebb tides might impede progress of the slower vessels through the entrance proved groundless. Paravanes were retained until arrival in the transport areas, but no mines were encountered.

And that is the news for tonight.

This is the news from Leyte Gulf, today, October 20, 1944.

The waters of Leyte Gulf were glassy calm as the convoys bearing the assault forces steamed into their appointed positions off the shores of Leyte in the very early morning hours of 20 October 1944.
There were three stages of the naval gunfire support: the pre-A Day bombardment, A Day bombardment, and close supporting missions to be delivered after H Hour and to continue until 24 October. A portion of the fire support group in support of the underwater demolition teams had bombarded the southern landing beaches and the town of Dulag on 18 October, a process which was repeated on the following day in support of the underwater demolition teams on the northern landing beaches.
At 0600 on A Day, 20 October, the battleships assigned to the Southern Attack Force opened fire on the beaches. A lone Japanese plane appeared at 0612 over the northern beaches, circled the convoy, and despite gunfire from the Maryland and West Virginia disappeared unscathed. At 0700 the battleships of the Northern Attack Force commenced firing. For two hours the six battleships, three to each attack force, fired on the beaches. Since no specific targets could be discerned or determined, the gunfire was directed at areas. Many enemy supply dumps and minor military installations were destroyed.
At 0900 the battleships ceased their fire and the cruisers and destroyers moved in closer to the shore to deliver their scheduled bombardment.
At 0850 gunfire was suspended in the vicinity of Catmon Hill, the most prominent coastal terrain feature near Dulag, in order to allow an air strike against installations in the interior by the planes from the CVE's of the amphibious force. During the day a total of 500 sorties by more than 140 planes were flown in direct support. Twelve direct support missions were carried out, nine against selected targets requested by ground troops and three against targets of opportunity. Dawn and dusk fighter sweeps were made against airfields. The aircraft from he carriers, which were beyond the range of the guns of enemy coastal defenses, did not attempt secondary missions upon the completion of a mission in the target area.
The principal bombing and strafing targets were revetments, dispersal areas, supply dumps, and bivouac areas, together with aircraft on islands near Leyte. Grounded planes were strafed and destroyed. The commander of the escort carriers made the surprising estimate that aircraft from his carriers had destroyed 125 planes on the ground and damaged an additional 90 more in the first three days of this "close support at a distance."7 Aircraft did not bomb the shore line, since gunfire from the vessels within the gulf was considered more effective.
At 0900 the cruisers commenced bombarding the beaches. They were joined at 0930 by the destroyers. At 0945 the cruisers and destroyers lifted their fire and directed it at the inland areas, at the flanks of the landing beaches, and at important roads and towns.
At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. Over a smooth sea a hot, brilliant, tropical sun beat down. The American forces were ready to land.

Wow...this is like one of those serial TV shows(GOOD Ones like Babylon 5 ) where the excitement just builds and builds for the audience....great job Kenny, I'm on the edge of my seat even though I know what already happened.

WoW`
you are very good!
Please keep it up!
Ron

Excellent Kenny,

I'm waiting for the next installment. (what happened next :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) )

Great stuff and I'm not even in the campaign. I wonder if anyone will model a ship with her guns turned towards the shore????

Cheers

Al

Today, I want to give you some background on the Japanese order of battle. For it is today, October 21, that the IJN prepares to respond to the American landings on Leyte.

On 21 July the chief of the naval general staff, Imperial General Headquarters, issued a directive for subsequent "urgent operations. The operational policy to be followed by the Combined Fleet was as follows:

1. Make utmost effort to maintain and make advantageous use of the strategic status quo; plan to smash the enemy's strength; take the initiative in creating favorable tactical opportunities, or seize the opportunity as it presents itself to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces.
2. Co-operate in close conjunction with the Army, maintain the security of sectors vital to national defense, and prepare for future eventualities.
3. Co-operate closely with related forces to maintain security of surface routes between Japan and vital southern sources of materials.

On 26 July the chief of the naval general staff informed Admiral Toyoda, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, that the future "urgent operations" were to be known as the SHÕ (Victory) Operations. There would be four SHÕ Operations. The first was to cover the defense of the Philippine Archipelago. It was essentially the last chance for Japan to remain in the war. Said Admiral Toyoda of the situation at the time of the battle of Leyte Gulf:

Since without the participation of our Combined Fleet there was no possibility of the land-based forces in the Philippines having any chance against your forces at all, it was decided to send the whole fleet, taking the gamble. If things went well, we might obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst should happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet. But I felt that that chance had to be taken. . . . Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off, so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the Philippines.

Since their carrier force was weak, the Japanese had developed a plan based upon the main gunnery strength of the fleet and upon the land-based air forces. Battleships and cruisers from a southern base were to approach Leyte from the south, fight their way to the landing beaches, and destroy Allied assault shipping. A decoy force was to attempt to lure the U.S. carrier task force away from the main action. Shore-based air forces were to inflict maximum damage on the American carrier forces whenever and wherever possible, but once the invasion came they were to conserve their strength until the day of the landings, when all the Allied assault shipping would be concentrated off the beaches and when their attacks on the U.S. carriers would assist the advancing Japanese fleet. The plan was designed to get the Japanese naval gunnery force into a position where it could do the greatest damage. Little attention was paid to getting it out. "The war had reached a point where the Japanese fleet, hopelessly outnumbered and, as imminent events would prove, even more hopelessly outclassed, could not risk the fleet action it had previously desired but was forced to expend itself in suicidal attack upon the United States transports.”

Upon receiving information on 17 October that American vessels were off the shores of Suluan Island, Admiral Toyoda immediately alerted his forces. On 18 October Toyoda, after intercepting American messages dealing with the landings on the island approaches to Leyte Gulf, activated his plan for the defense of the Philippine Islands. The target date (X Day) for the fleet engagement was set for 22 October but logistical difficulties caused a series of delays and on 21 October Admiral Toyoda changed X Day to 25 October. "From the far corners of the shrinking Empire the whole combatant strength of the Japanese Navy converged on Leyte Gulf."

The strongest Japanese naval force--the 1st Diversion Attack Force--moved from the south, reached Brunei Bay in northwest Borneo on 20 October, and after refueling split into two parts and proceeded on its way two days later. The main strength of the 1st Diversion Attack Force, under Admiral Kurita, sailed northeast up the west coast of Palawan (one of the Visayan Islands), and then turned eastward through the waters of the central Philippines to San Bernardino Strait, while the smaller unit commanded by Vice Adm. Shoji Nishimura moved eastward through the Sulu Sea in order to force an entrance at Surigao Strait. The 2nd Diversion Attack Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima, after leaving the Pescadores on 21 October, sailed south, past western Luzon, and after refueling in the Calamian Islands, just south of Mindoro, proceeded to follow and support the southern part of the 1st Diversion Attack Force in forcing Surigao Strait.

The Main Body, consisting chiefly of partially empty carriers with a destroyer escort, departed on the 20th, and on the evening of the 22nd turned southwest toward Luzon. It was commanded by Vice Adm. Jisabuto Ozawa. The Main Body was to act as a decoy to draw off the main American strength. The Japanese submarines off Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the Philippine Archipelago and the 2nd Air Fleet, shortly before 23 October, began to arrive on Luzon.

There were two American fleets in Philippine waters--the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid, whose superior was General MacArthur, and the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey, whose superior was Admiral Nimitz. The Seventh Fleet, which consisted of 6 old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts, had escorted the convoy to Leyte and now stood by to protect it as it unloaded. The Third Fleet was composed of Task Force 38 under Admiral Mitscher. It consisted of four task groups which averaged 23 ships each, divided about as follows: 2 large carriers, 2 light carriers, 2 new battleships, 3 cruisers, and 14 destroyers. The task force was to secure air supremacy over the Philippines, protect the landings, and apply unremitting pressure on Japan. If the opportunity to destroy the major portion of the Japanese fleet should arise or could be created, that destruction was to be its primary task.

The Japanese had 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers, 33 destroyers, and 2 battleship- carriers which carried no aircraft; there were 108 planes on the carriers and about 335 shore-based planes in the Luzon area.

More later. And don't forget, things are really starting to pick up Monday.

Gator

Hey guys. Today, I'm going to take the time to introduce the forces involved in the more well known battles of the Philippine campaign. Today, the Japanese forces sailed for they're day with destiny.

Here's the make up of the center force...


Northern Force ('Main Body') - Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa
Ozawa's Northern Force was intended to decoy the US covering forces away from the Leyte invasion fleet.
Ozawa was to prove remarkably successful in his mission.
1 CV - Zuikaku
3 CVL - Zuiho, Chitose, Chiyoda
2 BB - Ise*, Hyuga*
3 CL - Isuzu, Tama, Oyoda
8 DD - Hatsuzuki, Akitsuki, Wakatsuki, Shimotsuki, Maki, Sugi, Kuwa, Kiri
* Ise and Hyuga were battleships converted to 'battleship-carriers'.
They were able to operate a large number of seaplanes, but carried none at Leyte Gulf.

Center Force - Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita
The main Japanese force in the battle, although the Northern (decoy) force was referred to by the Japanese as the 'Main Body'.
5 BB - Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna
10 CA - Atago, Takao, Chokai, Maya, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone
2 CL - Noshiro, Yahagi
15 DD - Shimakaze, Hayashimo, Akashimo, Kishinami, Okinami, Naganami, Asashimo, Fujinami, Hamanami, Kiyoshimo, Nowaki, Urakaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Yukikaze

Southern Force - Vice-Admirals Nishimura and Shima

The Southern Force was intended to penetrate through Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf and join with Kurita's Center Force in attacking the invasion shipping.

It consisted of two groups, the larger (Force "C") commanded by Vice-Admiral Nishimura,
and the smaller ("Second Striking Force") by Vice-Admiral Shima.

These two groups were meant to coordinate their attacks, but failed to do so.

Force "C "(Van of the Southern Force) - V. Adm. Shoji Nishimura

2 BB - Fuso, Yamashiro
1 CA - Mogami
4 DD - Michisio, Yamagumo, Asagumo, Shigure

Second Striking Force (Rearguard of the Southern force) - V. Adm. Kiyohide Shima

2 CA - Nachi, Ashigara
1 CL - Abukuma
7 DD - Kasumi, Shiranuhi, Wakaba, Hatsuharu, Hatsushimo, Akebono, Ushio


Task Force 38, The Fast Carrier Force
(Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher in carrier Lexington)

8 Fleet Carriers, 8 Light Carriers, 6 Battleships, 6 Heavy Cruisers, 9 Light Cruisers, 58 Destroyers

The Fast Carrier Force and its ships

Task Force 38 was divided into four fast carrier groups, as follows -

Task Group One, TG38.1
(Vice Admiral John S. McCain in carrier Wasp)

3 Fleet Carriers, 2 Light Fleet Carriers, 4 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Anti-aircraft Light Cruisers, 14 Destroyers:

Wasp CV18 (Capt. O.A. Weller) Air Group 14 (Cdr W.C. Wingard) 43VF, 28VB, 18VT

Hornet CV12 (Capt. A.K. Doyle) Air Group 11 (Cdr F.R. Schraber) 40VF, 25VB, 18VT

Hancock CV19 (Capt. F.C. Dickey) Air Group 7 (Cdr J.D. Lamade) 41VF, 42(?)VB, 18VT

Cowpens CVL25 (Captain H.W. Taylor) Air Group 22 (Lt. Cdr T.H. Jenkins USNR) 26VF, 9VT

Monterey CVL26 (Captain S.H. Ingersoll) Air Group 28 (Lt. Cdr R.W. Mehle) 23VF, 9VT

CA69 Boston (Captain E.E. Herrmann)
CA27 Chester (Captain Henry Hartley)
CA25 Salt Lake City (Captain L.W. Busbey)
CA24 Pensacola (Captain A.P. Mullinix)

CL95 Anti-aircraft light cruiser Oakland (Captain K.S. Reed)
CL53 Anti-aircraft light cruiser San Diego (Captain W.E. Mullan)

DD589 Izard
DD581 Charrette
DD582 Conner
DD587 Bell
DD588 Burns
DD651 Cogswell
DD650 Caperton
DD652 Ingersoll
DD544 Boyd
DD547 Cowell
DD488 McCalla
DD435 Grayson
DD546 Brown
DD460 Woodworth

Task Group Two, TG38.2
(Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan in carrier Intrepid)

1 Fleet Carrier, 2 Light Fleet Carriers, 2 Battleships, 3 Light Cruisers, 16 Destroyers -

Intrepid CV11 (Captain J.F. Bolger) Air Group 18 (Cdr W.E. Ellis) 44VT, 28VB, 18VT

Cabot CVL28 (Captain S.J. Michael) Air Group 29 (Lt. Cdr W.E. Eder) 21VF, 9VT

Independence CVL22 (Captain E.C. Ewen) Night Air Group 41 (Cdr T.F. Caldwell) 19VF, 8VT

BB61 Iowa (Captain A.R. McCann)
BB62 New Jersey (Captain C.F. Holden)

CL64 Vincennes (Captain A.D. Brown)
CL89 Miami (Captain J.G. Crawford)
CL80 Biloxi (Captain P.R. Heineman)

DD536 Owen
DD535 Miller
DD537 The Sullivans
DD539 Tingey
DD673 Hickox
DD674 Hunt
DD675 Lewis Hancock
DD676 Marshall
DD797 Cushing
DD658 Colahan
DD686 Halsey Powell
DD687 Uhlmann
DD541 Yarnall
DD540 Twining
DD683 Stockham
DD684 Wedderburn


Task Group Three, TG38.3
(Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman in carrier Essex)

2 Fleet Carriers, 2 Light Fleet Carriers, 2 Battleships, 3 Light Cruisers, 1 Anti-aircraft Light Cruiser, 17 Destroyers -

Essex CV9 (Captain C.W. Weiber) Air Group 15 (Cdr David McCampbell) 51VF, 25VB, 19VT

Lexington CV16 (Captain E.W. Litch) Air Group 19 (Cdr T.H. Winters) 42VF, 30VB, 18VT

Princeton CVL23 (S) (Captain W.H. Buracker) Air Group 27 (Lt. Cdr. F.A. Bardshar) 25VF, 9VT

Langley CVL27 (Captain J.F. Wegforth) Air Group 44 (Cdr M.T. Wordell) 25VF, 9VT

BB59 Massachusetts (Captain W.W. Warlick)
BB57 South Dakota (Captain C.B. Momsen)

CL60 Santa Fe (Captain Jerauld Wright)
CL63 Mobile (Captain C.C. Miller)
CL62 Birmingham (Captain T.B. Inglis)
CL96 Anti-aircraft light cruiser Reno (Captain R.C. Alexander)

DD682 Porterfield
DD668 Clarence K. Bronson
DD669 Cotten
DD670 Dortch
DD672 Healy
DD651 Cogswell
DD650 Caperton
DD652 Ingersoll
DD653 Knapp
DD792 Callaghan
DD793 Cassin Young
DD795 Preston
DD558 Laws
DD559 Longshaw
DD560 Morrison
DD671 Gatling
DD794 Irwin

My thanks to L. M. Hinsley and to Fred Dunlap for correcting information originally given here for Task Group 38.3

Task Group Four, TG38.4
(Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison in carrier Franklin)

2 Fleet Carriers, 2 Light Fleet Carriers, 2 Battleships, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 11 Destroyers -

Franklin CV13 (Captain J.M. Shoemaker) Air Group 13 (Cdr R.L. Kibbe) 39VF, 31VB, 18VT

Enterprise CV6 (Captain Cato D. Glover) Air Group 20 (Cdr Dan F. Smith) 40VF, 34VB, 19VT

Belleau Wood CVL24 (Captain John Perry) Air Group 21 (Lt. Cdr V.F. Casey) 25VF, 9VT

San Jacinto CVL30 (Captain M.H. Kernodle) Air Group 51 (Cdr C.L. Moore) 19VF, 7VT

BB56 Washington (Captain T.R. Cooley)
BB60 Alabama (Captain V.R. Murphy)

CA32 New Orleans (Captain J.E. Hurff)
CA45 Wichita (Captain D.A. Spencer)

DD401 Maury
DD380 Gridley
DD388 Helm
DD400 McCall
DD389 Mugford
DD390 Ralph Talbot
DD392 Patterson
DD386 Bagley
DD441 Wilkes
DD442 Nicholson
DD443 Swanson

The Seventh Fleet

(Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid in amphibious warfare command vessel Wasatch)

At the time of the Leyte landings Seventh Fleet contained 738 vessels. Most of these were amphibious warfare vessels not listed in detail here.
The landing vessels were divided into two forces, the Northern Attack Force (Task Force 78) under Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey, and the Southern Attack Force (Task Force 79) under Vice Admiral T.S. Wilkinson.

Task Forces 78 and 79 each included a Fire Support Unit containing battleships and cruisers, and each unit of these forces had its destroyer screen.
In addition Seventh Fleet (Task Force 77) contained a Close Covering Group (TG77.3) of cruisers and destroyers, most of them being vessels of the Royal Australian Navy, and the Escort Carrier Group (TG77.4) under Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague. This last - the Escort Carrier Group - was to play an unexpected and decisive role in the battle.

Bombardment and Fire Support Group, Seventh Fleet (as of sunset October 24 1944)
(Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf in heavy cruiser Louisville)
This group is as constituted in order to counter the Japanese Southern Force in Surigao Strait.

6 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 29 Destroyers, as follows:

BB41 Mississippi
BB46 Maryland
BB48 West Virginia
BB43 Tennessee
BB44 California
BB38 Pennsylvania

CA28 Louisville
CA36 Minneapolis
CA33 Portland
CA Shropshire (Royal Australian Navy)
CL58 Denver
CL56 Columbia
CL46 Phoenix
CL47 Boise

DD586 Newcomb
DD664 Richard P. Leary
DD649 Albert W.Grant
DD562 Robinson
DD480 Halford
DD665 Bryant
DD663 Heywood L. Edwards
DD662 Bennion
DD481 Leutze
DD571 Claxton
DD508 Cony
DD505 Thorn
DD569 Aulick
DD643 Sigourney
DD628 Welles
DD476 Hutchins
DD519 Daly
DD470 Bache
DD Arunta (Royal Australian Navy)
DD593 Killen
DD471 Beale
DD688 Remey
DD678 McGowan
DD680 Melvin
DD691 Mertz
DD677 McDermut
DD798 Monsenn
DD679 McNair

Task Group 77.4, Escort Carrier Group
(Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague in escort carrier Sangamon)

Task Unit 77.4.1 - "Taffy One" (Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague)

CVE26 Sangamon(Captain M.E. Browder) Air Group 37 (Lt. Commander S.E. Hindman)
CVE27 Suwannee(Captain W.D. Johnson) Air Group 60 (Lt. Commander H.O. Feilbach USNR)
CVE28 Chenango(Captain George Van Deurs) Air Group 35 (Lt. Commander F.T. Moore)
CVE29 Santee(Captain R.E. Blick) Air Group 26 (Lt. Commander H.N Funk)
CVE82 Saginaw Bay(Captain F.C. Sutton) Composite Squadron 78(Lt. Commander J.L. Hyde)
CVE80 Petrof Bay(Captain J.L. Kane ) Composite Squadron 76(Commander J.W. McCauley)

DD534 McCord
DD531 Hazelwood
DD530 Trathen
DE402 Richard S. Bull
DE404 Eversole
DE403 Richard M. Rowell
DE217 Coolbaugh

Task Unit 77.4.2 - "Taffy Two" (Rear Admiral Felix B. Stump in Natoma Bay)

CVE62 Natoma Bay (Captain A.K. Morehouse) Composite Squadron 81 (Lt. Commander R.C. Barnes)
CVE61 Manila Bay (Captain Fitzhugh Lee) Composite Squadron 80 (Lt. Commander H.K. Stubbs USNR)
CVE77 Marcus Island (Captain C.F. Greber) Composite Squadron 21 (Lt. Commander T.O. Murray USNR)
CVE78 Savo Island (Captain C.E. Ekstrom) Composite Squadron 27 (Lt. Commander P.W. Jackson)
CVE79 Ommaney Bay (Captain H.L. Young) Composite Squadron 75 (Lt. A.W. Smith USNR)
CVE76 Kadashan Bay(Captain R.N. Hunter)Composite Squadron 20 (Lt. Commander J.R. Dale USNR)

DD555 Haggard
DD556 Hailey
DD554 Franks
DE344 Oberrender
DE343 Abercrombie
DE342 Richard W. Suesens
DE412 Walter C. Wann
DE414 Le Ray Wilson

Task Unit 77.4.3 - "Taffy Three" (Rear Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague in Fanshaw Bay)

CVE70 Fanshaw Bay (Captain D.P. Johnson) Composite Squadron 68 (Lt. Commander R.S. Rogers)
CVE68 Kalinin Bay (Captain T.B. Williamson) Composite Squadron 3 (Lt. Commander W.H. Keighley USNR)
CVE66 White Plains (Captain D.J. Sullivan) Composite Squadron 4 (Lt. E.R. Fickenscher)
CVE63 St. Lo (S) (Captain F.J. McKenna) Composite Squadron 65 (Lt. Commander R.M. Jones USNR)
CVE71 Kitkun Bay (Captain J.P. Whitney) Composite Squadron 5 (Commander R.L. Fowler)
CVE73 Gambier Bay (S) (Captain W.V.R. Vieweg) Composite Squadron 10 (Lt. Commander E.J. Huxtable)

DD533 Hoel (S) (Commander L.S. Kintberger)
DD532 Heermann (Commander A.T. Hathaway)
DD557 Johnston (S) (Commander E.E. Evans)
DE405 Dennis (Lt. Commander S. Hansen USNR)
DE413 Samuel B. Roberts (S) (Lt. Commander R.W. Copeland USNR)
DE339 John C. Butler (Lt. Commander J.E. Pace)
DE341 Raymond (Lt. Commander A.F. Beyer USNR)

later...Gator

GREAT JOB
Keep it up, to bad that can't do a movie about this
great battle!
"in Harms way" was their try!
Ron

I know. It's awesome that they made "Flag of Our Fathers", but considering this is the week of Mac's return to the Philippines and the mightiest naval battle since Jutland, I would think there would be something on about Leyte. Nope. Had to pop in Victory at Sea dvd. Such is the beast called Hollywood.

later...Gator