Hello All,

This will be the Official Thread for the Battle of Leyte Gulf Campaign.

The Campaign Dates are 23 Oct 2014 through 25 oct 2015 and all air / sea elements that participated in the battle are viable subjects for the campaign.

All are welcome to post historical data concerning the battle to this thread while we wait for the start.

I will establish the gallery this afternoon.

Have fun and hope you enjoy the campaign.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf raged from October 23 through 25, 1944. It was the largest naval battle ever fought — ending in the eclipse of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and its last sortie in force. Leyte Gulf also was the scene of the first organized use of Kamikaze (suicide) aircraft by the Japanese. The Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia was hit on October 21, and suicide attacks by the "Special Attack Force" began on October 25th.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of two preliminary strikes against the Japanese forces on the way to battle and three massive engagements once the fleets tangled. In other words, the last great battleship engagement of World War II, and in all of history, was staged in five parts, each bearing its own name:

For those interested in this campaign the following link provides a good listing of the Order of Battle for both the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied Forces.

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/L/e/Leyte_Gulf.htm

Hope this helps you on your selection choice.

I will be doing a Torpedo plane from the USS San Jacinto for this build

Sascha(ironowl)

I just scored the IJN Heavy Cruiser Maya so that will be my build for this campaign.

Hmmmm......maybe the Darter or Dace......

Michael, The Dace would be fitting considering she was the one who torpedoed the Maya. Good compliment to the scheme of the campaign.

I think I will do a dio with the torpedoes running towards her portside.

Dave

Might have to go with my 1/350 Tamiya Musashi

Guy, sounds great I am building the Musashi now. You can check it out in the Official Thread for the Battleship Campaign.

What aftermarket kits do you have? If you haven't bought any yet I would recommend against the Eduard PE kit. Not that its not good but it is missing several key pieces that are covered in other kits.

Just my thoughts.

Dave

OK for me it's almost certain that I'll build the gallant USS Hoel, just need to find out what if any changes need to be made from the Tamiya Fletcher class kit.

Any help here guy's?

Answered my own question, got a copy of the Shipcraft book on the Fletcher class, to do the Hoel I need the Trumpeter late square bridge, was going to get it any way so looks like I have a plan.

Yes, it looks like the key to doing any Fletcher destroyer is to know if the ship you want to do is of the earlier 'round' type bridge or the later 'squared' one.

I find the Navsource site a good reference for that.

Does anyone know of a Buckley class Destroyer Escort in 1/350 kit. I would love to model the USS Samuel B. Roberts for the campaign but cant find a kit.

Thanks, Bryan

Byan,

Trumpeter has the USS England DE-635 which is a Buckley Class. Scale Hobbyist has it for $23.79

https://www.scalehobbyist.com/catagories/Ship_Models/browse.php?s=0&t=1&u=11&micr=2400&pg=1&ppp=48&sb=stocknumber&so=a&era=0,6


Dave

Right, I have found the USS Samuel B. Roberts reported as both a Buckley class and Butler class Destroyer Escort (DE-413). I think in the end it is actually a Butler class. Confusing stuff.

Bryan

Bryan,

According to the Order of Battle List for the battle, the Samuel B. Roberts is a Butler Class.

According to this website:

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/J/o/John_C_Butler_class.htm

The Butler class closely resembled the Rudderows except for their use of geared turbine machinery in place of turboelectric drive

Scale Hobbyist has a 1/300 Linberg Model of a Rudderow Class DE for $12.29.

Not sure if that helps or not.

Dave

Leyte Gulf is my favourite battle in history - partly because it was such a large, swirling, complicated battle, but mostly because of the bravery on both sides, especially the US destroying charging to the Japanese fleet to give the carriers chance to escape.

I've got the Revell 1/144 Fletcher in the stash, I'd love to build it, but I'm too much of a scaredy cat. More likely is the Dragon 1/700 Hancock.

Neil,

Gotta admit, that 1/144 Fletcher would be pretty cool.

I agree, the Battle of Leyte Gulf is one of my favorites also. The opportunity was presented but the IJN failed to capitalize and in the end the IJN was a wrecked fleet.

Cant wait for this campaign to start...looking forward to seeing everyones subject.

Dave

A little back ground information for the campaign:

Battle of Leyte Gulf

By 12 September 1944, the Allies were firmly established in the Marianas and western New Guinea and were poised to seize Morotai, Peleliu, Yap, and Ulithi. The Philippines had been chosen over Formosa in July 1944 as the ultimate objective of the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific counteroffensives, and their liberation would cut the remaining sea lanes between Japan and the resources of the Netherlands East Indies.


MacArthur originally planned to invade Mindanao at Sarangani Bay on 25 October 1944, in order to secure airfields from which to cover the invasion of Leyte on 15 November. However, Halsey encountered very little air opposition during his carrier strikes in the area in mid-September 1944, and a pilot from Hornet who had crashed on Leyte and been spirited out by guerrillas reported that there were few Japanese on the island. Halsey proposed Mindanao be bypassed and Leyte seized with naval air cover alone. This suggestion was adopted at the OCTAGON conference on 15 September 1944, and the invasion date for Leyte was advanced to 20 October 1944.

The invasion would be a massive operation, supported by most of the naval power of Kinkaid's 7 Fleet and Halsey's 3 Fleet. Unfortunately, command arrangements for the Leyte campaign were muddled, as the Philippines lay close to the theater boundaries for the Southwest Pacific Area, Pacific Ocean Areas, and China-Burma-India theaters. Although MacArthur commanded Kinkaid's 7 Fleet in immediate support of the landing operations, distant cover was provided by the fast carriers of 3 Fleet, which was the main striking force of Pacific Fleet under Nimitz. There was not even a direct communication channel between Halsey and Kinkaid, and messages relayed through Manus sometimes took hours to arrive. This divided command would have important consequences during the battle. In particular, Halsey was under orders to make the destruction of the Japanese Fleet, not the protection of the amphibious forces, his highest priority.

Another command complication was that the amphibious elements of 3 Fleet were transferred to 7 Fleet for the landings. This left Halsey with little more than Task Force 38 under his command, and Halsey could not resist the temptation to bypass the highly competent Mitscher and issue orders directly to the individual task groups within Task Force 38.


The Japanese anticipated that the next Allied move would likely be against either the Philippines, Formosa, or the Ryukyus and, if successful, would cut off Japan's supply of oil. Faced with this looming disaster, the Japanese prepared a set of contingency plans (Sho Go, "Victory Operation") for committing their entire remaining naval strength against the Allied move. However, the unexpected swiftness of the Allied offensive caught the Japanese off-balance and poorly prepared.


The Japanese contingency plan for the defense of the Philippines, Sho Ichi Go ("Victory Operation One"), was activated on 22 October 1944, when word reached Tokyo that the Americans had begun landings at Leyte. Because of massive attrition at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and over Formosa and a shortage of fuel to complete the training of new pilots, the Japanese had virtually no aircraft or pilots for Ozawa's remaining carriers. However, the Japanese Navy still had powerful surface forces (under Kurita) built around the Yamato and Musashi. These were based at Singapore in order to be close to their fuel supplies, while the carrier forces remained in the Inland Sea to conduct as much pilot training as the fuel supply permitted. In order to give Kurita a chance to reach and destroy the American amphibious force, Ozawa was ordered to deliberately allow his force to be spotted and pursued by Halsey. While Halsey was thus diverted to the north, Kurita was to split his force, taking the main body through San Bernardino Strait north of Leyte Gulf while a detachment under Nishimura would enter Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait to the south in order to trap the Allied transports between them. Nishimura was to be joined by Shima, who was coming south with a small force of cruisers and destroyers that had eluded a trap set by Halsey off Formosa. Meanwhile, a small detachment from Kurita's fleet was assigned to transport reinforcements from Manila to Leyte.

Because of their lack of carrier aircraft, the Japanese were forced to rely primarily on land-based aircraft. There were several hundred aircraft scattered throughout the Philippines, but serviceability rates were low and not more than about 200 aircraft participated in the battle. These would be employed primarily in strikes against the American carriers, rather than as air cover for the Japanese naval surface forces, because it was believed that the inexperienced Japanese pilots would have a better chance of protecting the fleet by disabling the American flight decks than by attempting to intercept American air strikes. Postwar, staff officers from 2 Air Fleet claimed that they always kept ten fighters above Kurita's force, but Kurita claimed that he never saw any air cover.


The Japanese plan was overly complex and went badly from the start. It relied too heavily on close coordination of widely separated forces who communications proved highly unreliable during the battle. Furthermore, the Japanese command structure was at least as muddled as that of the Allies. Ozawa should have been the overall commander of the operation, but the reduction of his carrier fleet to a decoy force left Kurita as commander of the most crucial fleet element. Nishimura was an unimaginative officer with a death wish who did not get along with Shima, who commanded the weaker force but was slightly senior. This may explain why the plan did not call for Shima and Nishimura to join forces until the last moment. What is harder to understand is why the Japanese did not assign Shima to carry out the transport mission from Manila to Leyte in place of a detachment from Kurita's force.


Kurita's force was discovered off Palawan on 23 October 1944 by submarines Darter and Dace, which sank Atago and Maya and severely damaged Takao. Kurita also detailed two destroyers to escort Takao to safety, which took them out of the battle. The American submarine commanders found their approach simplified by the low speed of Kurita's force, just 16 knots, and by Kurita's failure to station any picket destroyers ahead of his main force. Furthermore, Kurita had chosen a narrow passage west of Palawan that was out of range of Allied air reconnaissance but gave him little room for maneuver. The contact report from the American submarines was the first indication to Allied intelligence that the main strength of the Japanese Navy was coming out to contest the Leyte landings. However, Darter ran aground in the poorly charted reefs of Palawan while maneuvering for a second attack (there had been no opportunity for a navigational fix in over 24 hours) and had to be scuttled, her crew being taken off by Dace.

That same day, submarine Bream spotted and torpedoed Aoba with Sakonju's Transport Force. Only one of the six torpedoes in the salvo hit the cruiser, but this was sufficient to cripple the cruiser, which was never repaired.


On receiving Darter and Dace's contact report, Halsey immediately alerted the fleet and recalled McCain's Task Group 38.1, which was on its way to Ulithi for rest and replenishment. The next four days saw the largest fleet action in history. Historians have generally divided the battle into four major engagements and a number of lesser engagements.

I just signed up to build the Fuso for the battleship campaign but I do have a Tamiya Tone to build also. I will have to see how fast I can get going on the Fuso before I could commit to building the Tone for this campaign.

Greg,

Contrary to what the campaign page states this campaign runs from 23 Oct 14 to 26 Oct 15 so you should have plenty of time for the Tone.

Hope it works out, would really love to see the Tone. Let me know what your thoughts are on it, thinking of getting it myself.

Dave

The Tone is a great kit! The detail is great. Tamiya made big improvements over there older kits that were released in the 80's (KGV, Missouri, Yamato, Bismarck). The new Yamato is unbelievable!! My friend has one. Very expensive but very nice.

I haven't as yet worked up the courage to join a campaign but this could be the one!! If so, USS Gambier Bay, 1/350 by Hasegawa with their own after market etched and timber deck.

If i'm going to give it a try I might as well jump in the deep end.....

Andrew,

The Gambier Bay is a great addition to this campaign. I felt the same way you did on my first campaign which I only started two months ago. It is a great time. Welcome aboard.

Dave